#### Interp -- Economic engagement requires a quid pro quo – the aff doesn’t.

Haas and O'Sullivan 00. [Richard N., former senior aid to President George bush, and Meghan L., Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Program fellow, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815733550/html/203.html#pagetop, 1-2]

**The term engagement** was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the word **appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations**. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. **Except in the few instances in which the** **U**nited **S**tates **has sought to isolate a regime** or country, **America** arguably **"engages" states** and actors **all the time** in one capacity or another **simply by interacting with them**. **This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much sdepends** to a significant degree **on positive incentives to achieve its objectives.** Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet **the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on** the extension or provision of **incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the U**nited **S**tates **has important disagreements**.

### China DA

#### China dominates Latin America now – comparatively more influential than the US.

Menendez 5-10. [Fernando, economist and a Principal at Cordoba Group International, a strategic consulting firm providing political and economic analysis "The East is rising, in Latin America" The Commentator -- www.thecommentator.com/article/3488/the\_east\_is\_rising\_in\_latin\_america]

When concerns about a rising China are broached they are usually focused around that nation’s increasing economic, financial and military power in Asia. Another region undergoing significant political and economic development, once considered the backyards of the United States, is less often cited. Latin America, however, is fast becoming a growing nub on China’s radar as a global power.¶ U.S. preoccupation with the Middle East has led arguably to a decline in American power in Latin America and elsewhere. Economically, as America’s influence wanes in the southern hemisphere China’s has grown. The shift can be seen in levels of loans, foreign direct investment and trade.

#### The link is increased economic engagement. Lack of US influence is key to China’s expansion in Latin America

**Shaiken et al 13** [Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UC-Berkeley. And Enrique Peters – Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn – Centro de Estudios China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 88-9]

The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these strategies evolve over time: Mexico’s regional and global position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade diversification. The decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may open more room for Mexico to adjust to a growth strategy less dependent on the United States. China’s rising role as a regional and global power and the new economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of change according to which China’s “going out” strategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and China reorient their strategies, it is likely that there will be an adjustment in the triangle’s dynamic, which may result in a closer relationship between these two countries.

#### Chinese international influence is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction

**Zhang ‘12**

[Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm ]

#### **As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas**. Poverty and development **The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries**. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. **In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience** **would i**ndeed **be helpful in the fight against global poverty**. War and peace **In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security**. **In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism**. The clash of civilizations **Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying**. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". **China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other**. **This philosophy is,** in fact, **wiser than** **that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument**. Environmental protection **Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model.** Perfecting the China model **The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger**. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is t**he rise of China's political soft power**, which **has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues**. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

The People’s Republic of China should **substantially increase its economic engagement towards Mexico by expanding and making permanent the currency swap agreement with the Banco do Mexico**

#### It solves – China is a better alternative than the US – solves the aff and avoids the disad.

Ellis 6. [Evan, Associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., with an emphasis on Latin American security issues, PhD in Political Science, "The New Chinese Engagement with Latin America: Understanding its Dynamics and the Implications for the Region" Booz-Allen -- March 3 -- www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/ellisthenewchineseengagementwithlatinamerica030306.pdf]

Aside from the intangible political dimension, China also represents a real alternative ¶ market for primary product exports, and to some degree, an alternative source of ¶ investment capital. China’s willingness to invest in the Bolivian hydrocarbon sector,82¶ for example, provides the new government of Evo Morales with another way of ¶ obtaining needed resources and technical expertise without having to make ¶ concessions to the 26 oil companies currently operating in the country. Chinese ¶ engagement with Bolivia thus gives Morales more latitude to proceed with the ¶ nationalization of that nation’s hydrocarbon sector. Similarly, the prospect of China as ¶ an alternative market for Latin American commodity exports has also introduced a new ¶ dimension to the question of trade integration with the United States, such as the Free ¶ Trade Area of the Americas.

#### China solves Latin American economic engagement better – Laundry list.

Hsiang 9. [Dr. Antonio, Associate Professor @ Chihlee Institute of Technology, Taiwan, "China rising in Latin America: More opportunities than Challenges" Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets -- Vol 1 Issue 1 -- November -- digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=jekem]

The Beijing Consensus has evolved to describe a plethora of alternative plans for economic ¶ development in the underdeveloped world. Ramo argues that China and India, who “most ¶ pointedly” ignored the World Bank and the IMF-championed Washington Consensus, “now ¶ have records that speak for themselves.”32 Consequently, the so-called the “Beijing ¶ Consensus” has been attracting attention in Latin America because of “China’s distinctive ¶ development model, . . . [which] posits far more state intervention in the economy and a greater concern with political stability and strong government to guide the development ¶ process.”33¶ Chinese academics argue that there are three signs that likely predict a convergence ¶ between China and Latin America. First, the background conditions are compatible because ¶ there are no fundamental conflicts of interest or historical animosities between China and ¶ Latin America. Second, the two regions have largely complementary economies. Third, ¶ China and Latin America both value diversification in international economic and political ¶ relations. For instance, both sides openly oppose “hegemonism,” “imperialism,” and power ¶ monopolies by a few developed countries.34

#### Latin America loves Chinese engagement

Dominguez 6. [Jorge, Professor @ Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, "China's Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes" Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper -- June -- www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]

In short, China has developed an impressive ¶ systematic long-term strategy to engage ¶ with Latin American countries. It has ¶ invested the time of its top leaders and the ¶ resources of its government. It has formulated symbolically productive discourses ¶ to characterize its relations with Latin ¶ American countries, and to assess the quality of relations between countries across ¶ time and signal the scope of likely trends. It ¶ has a nuanced understanding of the interest in some quarters in Latin America that ¶ China should help to balance U.S. power ¶ but shies away from embracing that hope. ¶ It acknowledges possible future difficulties but confidently asserts its belief that all ¶ key actors will perceive China’s role in Latin ¶ America to be non-threatening and peaceful.

#### oil prices will continue to increase - the oil market’s going into bull mode

QT 5/9/13 (Qatar Today, "Still Going Long on Oil”, <http://www.qatartodayonline.com/still-going-long-on-oil/>)

\*\*\*Interviewing Burkhard Varnholt - Chief Investment Officer and a member of the Executive Committee of Bank Sarasin; Executive MBA Program at the University of St. Gallen; PhD in Economics

When I interviewed Burkhard Varnholt just over two years ago, he was eager to explain why oil prices would rise to unprecedented levels in the following five years. Sarasin had just published the report Crude Oil: What’s moving oil prices in 2011, and it was very bullish on oil’s short-term ($120 a barrel in Q1 2012) and medium-term ($200 a barrel in 2015) prices. Varnholt wasn’t influenced by the geopolitical tensions in the MENA region at the time, so much as by longer-term factors such as supply and demand. He believed we were in the midst of “Peak Oil” and prices would very soon reflect this. The “low-hanging fruit”, or the easily-accessible oil, had all been discovered and explored, which meant it was getting more expensive to extract it; there hadn’t been a significant oil field discovered in 30 years. On top of this, OPEC members had an interest in overstating their reserves to achieve higher production allocations, meaning there was probably less oil out there than was estimated. So it was with much eagerness that I reminded him of his earlier estimations. The price of oil had remained relatively stable in the interim and only threatened $110 for a couple of weeks in February last year before dropping to $80 five months later – a far cry from the $37-145 margin in the latter half of 2008. It was trading at $96 in early April, 2013. So what happened? Surely the demand/supply factor coupled with the regional hostilities would drive the price up? “The simple reason is the discovery of all those oil reserves in the United States,“ explained Varnholt, “which has just shown us again that some of the most amazing things can happen in these commodity markets when prices reach certain levels.” He argued – with a trace of facetiousness – that oil companies would probably explore the front lawn of the White House for the commodity when prices went above $100 a barrel. “The oil discovery in the United States was a big game-changer,” he says, “and it was something I certainly didn’t expect, as I think nobody did. It turned the United States, which was always a net oil importer, into a net oil exporter. It completely changed the equation in the oil market.” The US recently discovered vast reserves of shale oil, and the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that production will jump to its highest level in 26 years next year. It says US oil imports willfall by a quarter between 2012 and 2014 because of the rising domestic production. It also forecasts that average global oil prices will be around $99 in 2014. Still bullish Whilst Varnholt had previously predicted that oil prices would hit $200 a barrel in 2015, he was still bullish about the price of oil in the long term. “I’m still expecting it to reach $200 at some point, but 2015 is now a little too early for this,“ he says, before qualifying his thesis. “What hasn’t changed is that the general direction of commodity markets remains upwards, and that’s because of factors that I alluded to two years ago, such as demographic growth, economic growth, bottlenecks in supplies, and bottlenecks in infrastructure – upstream, in getting the stuff out of the ground; midstream, transporting it; and downstream, getting the biggest bang out of every barrel. These bottlenecks, I predict today, will be big surprises to the markets in the next few years. What I believed back then was that the chances of finding something really big, like the Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia, were negligible – that the “low-hanging fruit“ had all been taken. However, what will continue to contribute to the market are the expensive resources to dig deep or reach far out like they do in Africa or Latin America. “The market for liquefied natural gas (LNG) is by no means a matter of the past, either, because of the oil discoveries in the United States. One of the big surprises that the markets haven’t factored in is the transformation of coal-powered stations across Europe, the United States and China into cleaner power stations using gas instead of coal. China is really suffocated by the exhausts and fumes it produces from burning all this coal. Then again, at some point, there will come a big game-changer in the market for fossil fuels. So the general direction I continue to believe is up and the fundamental trends that I mentioned are, I’m afraid, still alive and will only get harsher in the next few years,” says Varnholt.

#### Increasing cooperation with Venezuela lowers oil prices

Scicchitano 3/6/13 – NewsMax Staff (Paul Scicchitano, “ Hoekstra: Post-Chavez Venezuela Could Fuel Eventual Oil Price Drop”, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/chavez-death-oil-drop/2013/03/06/id/493333)

The former chairman of the powerful House Intelligence Committee tells Newsmax the death of Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez is unlikely to have any effect on global oil prices in the short term, but could bring greater stability — and possibly a big price drop — in the long term. “If we get a government that’s more friendly to the West — it brings about fundamental reforms in Venezuela — I think you could perhaps in the long term say it’s positive for the United States,” predicted Hoekstra speaking in an exclusive interview on Tuesday. “It’s positive for American consumers because a stable oil market will mean that prices will go down. “Chavez was always one you’re never quite sure what was going to happen,” he said. “Instability breeds premium pricing. Stability will lower prices, lower risk — and hopefully that’s what we’ll see.” Hoekstra, who is on the advisory board of LIGNET, a global intelligence and forecasting service based in Washington, D.C., said that the United States should respond to Chavez’ death in a “professional” and respectful manner. “We need to extend our sympathy to the people of Venezuela. They’ve lost their president,” explained Hoekstra, who recently made a bid for a U.S. Senate seat in Michigan. But Hoekstra believes that the United States should also approach Chavez’ passing as an opportunity. “We need to recognize that Hugo Chavez has not been a friend to the United States and has been an antagonist to us,” he said. “And we now need to use this as an opportunity to reach out to the people of Venezuela, and hopefully start a new chapter with that country and develop a much better relationship.” He believes the United States will pursue back channels to promote a new relationship with the oil-rich state. “I think at least over the next couple of weeks, over the next couple of months, there’s just going to be a lot of backroom discussions,” said Hoekstra. “I hope that there’s reaching out to see if there is a way to find common ground and to set the relationships between the two countries on a new track.” Any time there is a leadership change in a country, there also is a chance for the United States to achieve better relations, he explained. “Any time there is a significant change, which you’ll have when a leader of a country passes away, it’s significant change. It provides us with that opportunity,” he said. “I ‘m assuming that the secretary of state, the president, the full administration, is going to do everything that they can to use this as creating a turning point in our relationships.” He predicted that the United States will be in a much better position to determine whether it is better off with Venezuela’s new leadership six months from now.

#### Saudi would flood the market in response to the plan and crash oil prices

HULBERT ’12 - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review; Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations; Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “OPEC's Pending Bloodbath”. June 10, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/06/10/opecs-pending-bloodbath/)

That’s unlikely to happen, precisely because Riyadh can bring further pricing pressures to bear if it wants to get its way in the cartel. The Kingdom’s policy space has admittedly tightened over the past couple of years, but they remain the only producer capable of significantly increasing or reducing production at will. Initial tanker data from Europe suggests Riyadh may have started reigning in production that was running around 6% over OPEC quota. It’s also raised July benchmarks for Arab Light grades in Asia. But Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria will want restraint to come far faster and far deeper to firm prices. The line being spun from the ‘free lunch’ brigade is that storage should easily cover any Iranian spikes when EU sanctions come into full effect 1st July, while OPEC quotas should be pared down to 29.5mb/d (or less). Cheap words from petro-hawks, not least because they’ll all continue to cheat on quotas to squeeze out every last drop they have. Riyadh knows that of course; hawks want a price floor to be set at $100/b to sustain political regimes, but to do so entirely at Saudi expense. Russia is no different outside the cartel: free riding 101. Saudi Arabia (and its GCC partners) might be willing to play ball given ongoing concerns from the Arab Awakening, but with some budgetary tweaks and counter-cyclical cash to burn, they could all easily survive at $85/b making Iran et al sweat. Tehran might decide to rip up formal quotas as it did in June 2011, but that would be a costly mistake. If the Saudis let prices fall, political outages across smaller producer states could help to set a floor for them anyway. Iran would have no say in the matter. Given such ‘pricing perils’, Saudi Arabia holds all the aces to settle institutional issues, not to mention giving the global economy more breathing space (and Washington greater leeway over Iranian sanctions). But the real reason to let prices fall a little further isn’t just to make very clear to OPEC states where the ultimate volume and pricing power rests, but to fight Riyadh’s bigger battle over the next decade: Retaining 40% of OPEC market share in the midst of supposedly huge non-OPEC supply growth. It didn’t go unnoticed that despite Saudi production averaging 31 year highs and prices hitting $128/b in March 2012, the forward curve for 2018 was trading at $30/b discounts relative to spot. You’d think with the cartel maxed out and proximate demand side problems looking bleak, five year curves would be exactly the other way, in sharp contango (i.e. far above prompt prices) once the global economy and demand side fundamentals were fixed. The fact they weren’t is principally because the market thinks vast swathes of unconventional production will come online, not just in North America where production is back above 6mb/d, but in Canada, Brazil and even Arctic extremes. At $100/b that was a fair bet to place, but once benchmark prices drop back to two figures, the 6.4 trillion barrels of unconventional reserves sitting in the Americas look a far less certain prospect. Canadian tar distinctly sticky; Brazilian pre-salt horribly deep; Russian Arctic plays simply impossible. So when OPEC meets in Vienna expect Saudi Arabia to call the shots. The new Secretary General will either be a Saudi national, or a compromise candidate Riyadh can live with. Quotas will stay close to 30mb/d with minor reductions possible. Thinly veiled threats of sustained (or increased) production will be made if Iran doesn’t play ball. Yet the long term price point to watch isn’t just one that keeps OPEC in business and Riyadh in control, but where the al-Saud can maintain secular market share. Letting prices informally slide to $85-90/b might be the kind of warning shot Riyadh wants to send to scrub unconventional plays off global balance sheets. Its OPEC colleagues will see that as sailing far too close to the political wind, but a Saudi bloodbath now, might be just the medicine OPEC requires to sustain its long term health, not unless the cartel is absolutely determined to keep pricing itself out of existence.

#### Prolonged dip in prices collapses all producer states, causes political repression and state collapse, and unleashes wars across the world

Hulbert 12 Matthew Hulbert is an analyst at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations "The political perils of low oil prices" July 9 2012 www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=3796&id\_mailing=295&toegang=49182f81e6a13cf5eaa496d51fea6406

As unedifying as all that might be, the bigger problem producer states have is that internal repression has no guarantee of success these days. It didn't work for Gadhafi in Libya, and it's unlikely to work for Assad in Syria in the long term. As fierce as the rear-guard battles have been, they’ve not been militarily conclusive or conducive to on-going hydrocarbon production. ¶ Follow that argument through and it is clear that if the bulk of producer regimes were struggling to hang on in a $125/b world, they stand little chance of pulling through in an $80/b (or less) environment. So we reach the third step, and logical conclusion of our argument. The lower prices go, the more likely political unrest creates serious supply disruptions affecting physical supplies, with concomitant effects on paper markets. That obviously puts a radically new spin on what 'cyclical' means as far as price and political instability is concerned, but when we look across producer states, it’s hard to find any major players not sitting on a powder keg of political risk these days. ¶ More likely than not, it will be some of the smaller players that get caught in the cross fire first. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is already deeply concerned about Bahrain relative to its Eastern Province. State implosion in Yemen is seen as an internal issue of the al-Saud to deal with, while serious deterioration in Iraq is becoming increasingly problematic in the North. Libya could see any post-war oil gains rapidly wiped out, Sudanese production has already fallen prey to intractable internal disputes, Kazakhstan remains entirely 'dispensable' in Central Asia given a lack of external clout in the region, while Nigeria has new civil strife problems to confront with Boko Haram. That’s before we consider intractable problems in Central Africa and the Horn of Africa. Any one of these jurisdictions could end up with a scorched earth policy if financing gaps aren’t closed. ¶ Go further up the producer state 'food chain', and some of the world's largest players all have the same structural political problems, be it in the Middle East, Eurasia or Latin America. Any sign that a bigger petro-beast is losing control, and prices would rapidly lift. That might be welcome news for producer states lucky enough to ride the price wave and remain intact, but it's a very dangerous game to play. ¶ And that's the whole problem here - the gap between geological costs of production and the geopolitical cost of survival is simply too wide for producers to cover without falling back on draconian measures. If this 'self-correcting' mechanism between price and political unrest starts supporting an informal price floor then so be it, but we shouldn't be fooled that this is serving anyone's interests - on either side of the consumer-producer ledger. Yes, it will help firm prices when certain producers struggle to adapt to rapidly shifting economic conditions, but assuming that more and more producer states hit political problems as prices slip, we're merely cementing the 'too big to fail' status of the very largest oil producers. Seeing petro-states dropping like political flies as prices correct isn't a proper 'solution' for a floor, not only because prices will rebound with a vengeance when markets tighten, but because it will make us even more dependent on a handful of key suppliers. As we all know from previous problems in Iraq (2.9 mb/d), Iran (3 mb/d), Libya (1.48 m/bd), Nigeria (2.4 mb/d) and even Venezuela (2.7 mb/d), once things go politically wrong, it takes a very long time, if ever, to get back to optimal production levels. It's the antithesis of where consumers want to be in terms of sourcing plentiful and fungible supplies.¶ Final scene: corpses all over the stage¶ By way of reminder, as much as petro-states currently face a systemic crisis trying to set a price floor, it was only in March that we saw how badly placed OPEC is to moderate the market at the top. Seeing petro-states in a pickle might warm the hearts of many right now, but markets can turn, and turn fast. When they do, the oil weapon will shift target as well. It will no longer be pointed at petro players heads, but directly at consumer states. That's the consequence of a dysfunctional energy system - not just with a $50-$150/b outlook eminently possible, but swings well beyond that 'price band' all too likely. ¶ Splitting this price directly in two and sticking close to $100/b might not be that bad an idea after all: Mopping up the mess from producer state implosion would require an effort far beyond the international systems capabilities and reach. Carefully agreed truces are always better than outright wars, particularly for those squeamish about collateral damage. Corpses would litter the entire energy stage.

Humanity does not face extinction from disease

Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once:

as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

No impact – anything virulent enough to be a threat would destroy its host too quickly

Joshua **Lederberg**, professor of genetics at Stanford University School of Medicine, 1999, Epidemic The World of Infectious Disease, p. 13

The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a shared interest in our survival. Almost any pathogen comes to a dead end when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive. So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a wipeout of both host and pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of large-scale ecological upsets.

**Economic decline doesn’t cause war**

**DEUDNEY 1991** (Daniel, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April)

Poverty wars. In a second scenario, declining living standards first cause internal turmoil, then war. If groups at all levels of affluence protect their standard of living by pushing deprivation on other groups, class war and revolutionary upheavals could result. Faced with these pressures, liberal democracy and free market systems could increasingly be replaced by authoritarian systems capable of maintaining minimum order. If authoritarian regimes are more war-prone because they lack democratic control, and if revolutionary regimes are war-prone because of their ideological fervor and isolation, then the world is likely to become more violent. The record of previous depressions supports the proposition that widespread economic stagnation and unmet economic expectations contribute to international conflict. Although initially compelling, **this scenario has major flaws.** One is that **it is** arguably **based on unsound economic theory. Wealth is formed not so much by the availability of cheap natural resources as by capital formation through savings and more efficient production**. Many resource-poor countries, like Japan, are very wealthy, while many countries with more extensive resources are poor. Environmental constraints require an end to economic growth based on growing use of raw materials, but not necessarily an end to growth in the production of goods and services. In addition, **economic decline does not** necessarily **produce conflict.** How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And **as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces.** As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “**The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones**.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such **depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930's, increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.**

**WWII example flows neg**

**Ferguson, ’06**, Professor of History at Harvard , OCTOBER 2006 (Niall, MA, D.Phil., is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University. He is a resident faculty member of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies. He is also a Senior Reseach Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed**. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered.** Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, **no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.**